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ABSTRACT 
 
  
 
This paper outlines the findings of a model of plea bargaining with multiple defendants, in 
which a prosecutor makes plea offer sequentially. It is shown that plea discount can be 
minimized with sequential offers and that not all of defendants shall be induced to plead 
guilty. By allowing sequential offer, a prosecutor has more power in the plea bargaining, 
which may increase social welfare by giving appropriate level of punishment to the guilty. 
 
 
 
 
본 논문은 복수의 피의자가 존재하는 경우 시차 제안을 통해 유죄인정감형제도의 효과를 
긍정적으로 유도할 수 있음을 보였다. 시차 제안의 가능성으로 인해 피의자에게 제시되는 양형 
감량이 최소화될 수 있음이 제시되었고, 모든 피의자가 유죄를 인정하게 되는 균형점 이외의 
해가 존재함을 증명하였다. 시차 제안의 허용으로 인해 검사는 보다 높은 수준의 협상력을 
지니게 되며, 이를 통해 피의자에게 엄정한 양형을 부여함으로써 사회후생을 증가시킬 수 있게 
된다.  
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Ⅰ. Introduction 
 
 
A plea bargaining is a deal offered by a prosecutor as an incentive for a 
defendant or defendants to plead guilty. Plea bargaining agreement has been 
practiced in the United States since several hundred years. Although estimates vary, 
95% of criminal cases were resolved by plea bargaining in United States.1 Yet, the 
wide use of plea bargaining is not without criticism. Skeptics of plea bargaining 
argue that the criminal justice system has been too soft on criminals by allowing for 
less sentence in exchange for a guilty plea.  
Introduction of plea bargaining system aims to gain more information about the 
crime by allowing plea discounts to the defendant(s). So the main objective of plea 
bargaining is information-gathering effect, although the plea bargaining system is 
going to save trial cost borne by prosecutors. However, to induce the defendant(s) to 
plead guilty, a prosecutor shall offer lenient penalty in the plea offer, which tends to 
decrease the social welfare.2 Moreover, plea bargaining could be unfair when a plea 
bargain gives the most culpable defendant the lowest penalty.3 However, previous 
works have focused primarily on analyzing possibility of unfair settlement so far,4 
and the first and main disadvantage of plea bargaining, leniency to the guilty was not 
thoroughly analyzed. 
This paper tries to support plea bargaining system by providing method to 
minimize disadvantages in theoretical model. In section 2, a model of multiple 
defendants is introduced. Section 3 describes the effect of sequential offer by a 
prosecutor, and tries to characterize an equilibrium. Section 4 includes concluding 
remarks as well as points for discussion.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
1  See US Department of Justice (2000). 
2  I followed Adelstein and Miceli (2001) in that punishing truly guilty defendants is directly linked 
to social benefits. So less severe punishment imposed on the guilty implies less social welfare, if 
trial cost is ignored.  
3  Kobayashi (1992) tried to explain unfair plea bargains.  
4  For example, Kobayashi (1992) and Kim (2009).  
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Ⅱ. Model 
 
 
In this section, I consider plea bargaining model which was employed by Kim 
(2009). A prosecutor (�) has accused two codefendants (��, � = 1, 2), who jointly 
committed a crime. The sanctions need proof of their guilt at formal trial, while it is 
common knowledge that they jointly committed the crime. 
If the defendants go to the formal trial, each defendant � is expected to be 
sentenced of s� (>0) when he is convicted as guilty. Without loss of generality, let’s 
assume that �1 � �2 . The probability of conviction is set to �  if there is no 
testimony from defendant(s) via plea bargaining. Here, � is strictly less than 1, as 
there is probability of acquittal after formal trial. Defendants may accept the plea 
offer with reduced sentences by the prosecutor. It is assumed that the defendant 
pleading guilty has to testify against the other defendant.  
The sequence of movement in the model is as follows. First, � makes plea 
offers �� � � � �0, ∞� to each defendant ��. It was assumed in previous literature 
that the prosecutor is able to make only simultaneous plea offers to both of the 
defendants.5 In the present paper, rather, I assume that the prosecutor can approach 
defendants to make plea offer one by one. Then, �� decides whether to accept or 
reject the offer. If the first defendant �� who � makes plea offer accepts the offer, 
he is sentenced to ib  at court with certainty. Also if �� testifies against �� via 
plea bargaining, �� will be convicted with probability ���� �� when �� moves to 
the formal trial. For simplicity of analysis, let �� = 1. If he rejects the offer, then he 
goes to the formal trial. After knowing decision of the first defendant on plead, the 
prosecutor can choose to make plea offer to the second defendant, or she can just 
move the case to the formal trial without more plea bargaining.  
It is assumed that �� minimizes his expected sentence, and that � maximizes 
the penalties6 on the defendants. As it is common knowledge that both defendants 
committed a crime, the prosecutor who is representative of society tries to penalize 
the defendants by appropriate sentence. I assume that s� is the appropriate level of 
penalty given ���s crime committal. So the objective of � is to maximize the 
                                                                                                                                                      
5  For example, Kobayashi (1992), Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar (2009) and Kim (2009). 
6  This penalty-maximizing assumption was employed by Kobayashi (1992) and is equivalent to the 
special case of Kim (2009) with risk-neutral prosecutor. Kim (2009) considered risk-attitude of 
prosecutor for equilibrium selection among multiple equilibria. The present paper can be extended 
along with consideration of risk-attitude, but the main result does not change.  
 probability of sentences while holding the level of sentences as high as possible. 
The strategy of � is defined by 
the plea offer to �2 when �
rejected the offer. Note that 
can choose not to make plea offer to 
the case where �2� is set to be sufficiently high, or specifically be greater than 
� · �2. 
In my model, the strategy of 
∆= �� � accept, reject�. The strategy of 
∆= �� � accept, reject� and 
decision of �1. Lastly, in order 
trial cost is set to be zero.  
Ⅲ. Equilibrium with Sequential Plea Bargaining
The model with simultaneous offers has a unique equilibrium in which 
��1, �, �2 ) and both of the offers are accepted by 
negotiations.8 The equilibrium is illustrated as 
 
[Figure 1] Equilibrium with 
                                                                                
7  It is assumed that a tie in payoffs is resolved in favor of acceptance of plea offer.
8  In fact, this is true only when �
and both of the offers are accepted. See Kim (2009) for details.
�2 
�2 
��2 
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σ� = ��1, �2�, �2�� � � � � � �. Here, 
1 accepted the offer �1, and �2� is the offer when 
�2� and �2� need be not necessarily different. Also 
�2 if �1 accepted the offer �1. This can be 
�1  is defined by σ1: � � � � � � ∆  
�2 is defined by σ2: � � � � ∆  
� is the history information set, which contains the 
to focus on strategic aspect of a plea bargaining, 
 
 
 
 
 
�
defendants, 7  under joint 
� in [Figure 1].  
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Now let’s characterize the equilibrium with sequential offers. First, plea offer to 
the second defendant is considered. There are two possible cases to the second 
defendant; one in which the first defendant accepts the offer with �1, and the other 
in which the first one rejects. If �1 already decided to accept the offer, �2 will 
accept the offer if and only if �2� � �2. If �1 rejects the offer, then �2 will accept 
the offer if and only if �2� � � · �2. Thus, the decision of �2 depends on the 
history information. Then the following result is easily derived.  
 
Lemma 1 P chooses the offer to �2 as ��2�, �2�� = ��, � · �2�, where � � �2.  
Proof  When �1 accepts the offer and chooses to testify against �2, in the formal 
trial �2 will be convicted with �2 for sure. Then, � has no incentive to 
offer �2� less than �2. Note that if �2� � �2, then it is virtually identical 
to the case where � does not make offer to �2. When �1 rejects the offer, 
� has two feasible options; to make �2 accept �2�, or to make �2 reject 
�2� . In the case where �2 as well as �1 rejects plea offers, then the 
expected penalties on the defendants are � · ��1 � �2�. If �  offers the 
maximum acceptable sentence � · �2 to �2, conditional on the testimony 
against �1, then the expected penalties on the defendants will be ��1 �
�·�2. Thus, she prefers offering �2�=�·�2. ■ 
 
Given the offer to �2, the offer to �1 is analyzed. If the first defendant accepts 
the offer, then the penalty on him is �1. If he rejects the offer, the penalty becomes 
�1 as �2 is going to accept the offer of �2� = � · �2. So �1 will accept the offer if 
and only if �1 � �1. Then the following result is immediate.  
 
Lemma 2 � chooses the offer to �1 as �1 � �1.  
Proof  From the above argument, it is trivial as � is maximizing penalty on the 
defendants. ■ 
 
<Table 1> shows the payoff matrix of defendants, given the prosecutor’s offers 
in Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. However, the normal form of the game is somewhat 
misleading. As �1 moves first and �2 moves after that, �1 considers his payoff 
via forward looking movement of �2 . It appears that �1 ’s (weakly) dominant 
strategy is ‘Reject’, but he is going to take ‘Accept’ as �2 is going to take ‘Accept’ 
regardless of �1’s choice.
9 Now I have the main result in the following proposition. 
                                                                                                                                                      
9  Again, it is assumed that a tie in payoffs is resolved in favor of acceptance of plea offer. 
 <Table 1> The Reduced Normal 
 
 
�1 Accept
 
 
[Fig
 
Proposition 1 With sequential offers, there exist an equilibrium in which 
��1, �2�, �2�� = ��1, �2, �, �2� 
Proof  From Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, it is shown that the defendants will accept the 
offers and have no profitable deviation. For the prosecutor, who has 
incentive to maximize penalties on the defendants, she has no profitable 
deviation, as the resulting penalties 
sentence. ■ 
 
In proposition 1, I consider the equilibrium in which all the defendants accept the 
offers and there is no formal trial. The structure of game among the prosecutor and 
the defendants is illustrated in 
sequence of the model is explicitly described. However, another equilibrium in 
which not all of the defendants accept the offers is feasible, which is stated in the 
following corollary.  
(�1 � �2, ��1, ��2) (�1 � �2,
 � 
�2 
 
 � 
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 �2  
 Accept Reject 
 (�1, �2) (�1, �2) 
Reject (�1, ��2) (��1, ��2)
ure 2] The Extensive Form (1) 
�
 and both of defendants accept sequentially.  
��1 � �2� is the maximum possible 
[Figure 2]. Unlike <Table 1> in the normal form, 
��1, ��2) (�1 � ��2, ��1, ���2) (���1 � �2�, ���
 � 
�2 
�1 
� 
(�1, �2�, �2�) 
� 
 � 
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1, ���2) 
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Corollary 1  With sequential offers,
��1, �2�, �2�� = ��1, �, �, �2�  
Proof  Similar argument in the proof of proposition 1 holds. And still the 
prosecutor, who has incentive to maximize penalties on the defendants, has 
no profitable deviation, as the resulting penalties 
maximum possible sentence. 
 
The result of corollary is noteworthy. Note that the equilibrium outcomes from 
proposition 1 and corollary 1 is explicitly 
be punished with deserved sentence. Moreover, fairness of this outcome, which 
provides virtually no discount to the defendants, is much stronger than those in Kim 
(2009).10 The equilibrium is illustrated by 
the assumption that the defendants jointly committed the crime, and that possibility 
of innocent defendant(s) was ignored. 
[Figure 3] illustrates the structure of model, in which the prosecutor makes the 
plea offer only to �1 in the equilibrium. While 
��1, �2�, �2�� to the defendants at the first stage in the equ
 
[Fig
 
                                                                                
10  Fairness in Kobayashi (1992) or in Kim (2009) is relative among defendants, while that in the 
present paper can be seen as societal justice. 
� 
��1 � �2, ��1, ��2� 
 � 
 there exist an equilibrium in which �
where � � �2 and only �1 accepts the offer. 
��1 � �2�  
■  
‘fair’ in the sense that the defendants will 
�� in [Figure 1]. This fairness is from 
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ilibrium in proposition 1, 
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she can make separate offer to the defendants sequentially. The main result 
underscores that utilizing sequential offers can enhance bargaining power of the 
prosecutor, to increase penalties on the defendants. 
 
 
Ⅳ. Concluding Remarks 
 
Recently, in Korea, it was announced that the plea bargaining system will be 
implemented in 2011.11 It was said that this introduction of plea bargaining system 
aims to gain more information about the crime by allowing plea discounts to the 
defendant(s). So the main object of this policy change is information-gathering 
effect, although the plea bargaining system is going to save trial cost borne by 
prosecutors. However, to induce the defendant(s) to plead guilty, a prosecutor shall 
offer lenient penalty in the plea offer, which tends to decrease the social welfare. 
The present paper demonstrates that plea bargaining can be utilized to punish the 
guilty at the maximum with sequential offers. The prosecutor, by strategically 
timing and targeting her plea offers, can increase the level of expected penalties on 
the culprits. Considering cost saving motive, which was refrained from the present 
paper, along with information gathering effect is expected to enhance our 
understanding of plea bargaining system, I hope. 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                                                      
11  Public Notice No. 2010-251, Ministry of Justice, Republic of Korea. 
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